A model of contagion propagation in the Russian interbank market based on the real data is developed.
The recent financial crisis has brought into the focus of attention systemic risks related to economic interactions between banks. Such interactions are most naturally described in terms of a network of their mutual obligations [1, 2, 3, 4] . The notion of systemic risks refers to various crisis phenomena involving many economic agents having their origin in their interaction, e.g. in the outstanding interbank loans [5, 6, 7] .
One of the most important types of crisis phenomena taking place on complex networks are epidemic type cascading processes, see Ref. [8] . In the particular case of interbank network considered in the present paper this is a contagion process triggered by the default of some bank possibly followed by defaulting of some of its neighbors and, finally, to a formation of a default cluster. The phenomenon of contagion in interbank markets has drawn a lot of attention in the literature, see e.g. the recent review [7] . Theoretical foundations for building a quantitative description of financial contagion were discussed in Refs. [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] .
At a more technical level a central issue is that of an interplay between topological properties of a network and those of epidemic cascades on it. In particular, the role of degree-degree correlations was studied in Refs. [14, 15, 16, 17] while that of clustering was analyzed in Refs. [18, 19] . Another key requirement is using, to the maximal possible extent, realistic data on interbank networks. To our knowledge the complete data including those on interbank loans and bank balance sheets were used in Refs. [21, 22, 24, 23] for the Brazilian and Russian interbank networks respectively.
The present paper continues investigation of systemic risks at the Russian interbank market begun in Refs. [22, 23] and focuses on developing a mathematical model of contagion process taking into account all the aspects of geometry of interbank network, important features of the balance sheet structure of participating banks and institutional regulation relevant for providing a quantitatively correct description of default cascades. We argue that to build such a description one should take into account empirical default propagation probability, bow-tie structure, degree distribution and disassortative correlation structure of interbank networks. An interesting feature we observe is that although the original interbank network is characterized by high clusterization, default clusters are predominantly tree-like. This latter property agrees with findings of Ref. [20] 1 . The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 1 we discuss structure and main features of the Russian money market and the data used in the analysis. In the section 2 we analyze empirical characteristics of the deposit market from the network perspective including its bow-tie structure, degree distributions and correlations, clustering and default propagation probabilities. In section 3 we explore the structure of the default cluster caused by the default of a randomly chosen bank and after that introduce mathematical formalism for systemic risk representation in chapter 4. Conclusions are given in the chapter 5.
Russian money market: empirics and data description
Russian money market consists of the three main segments, markets of deposits, REPO and SWAP.
Operations at the deposits market are uncollateralized: banks bound their risk in lending money to counterparties by setting limits with values set using intrinsic banking models and expert opinions. Lending risks are also regulated by the special requirement of the Bank of Russia constraining the value of exposure to a counterparty. The uncollaterized nature of the deposit market makes it the most vulnerable with respect to trust evaporation. During the crises deposit markets often freeze and require significant efforts from regulators for relaunching.
Less risky is the REPO market at which collateral, which is most often include securities including government and corporate bonds and equities, is required. In operations with money borrowing different types of collateral are valued with discounts which reduce market risk of collateral. Credit risk more often taken into account in the credit rate. While during the peak of the crisis REPO market in Russia collapsed, it had started functioning before the recovery of the deposit.
The least risky is the SWAP market. Often swap operations are used as a source of ruble liquidity. In exchange of rubles lender get foreign collateral collateral (USD and EUR prevailing). Such type of operations is characterised by short terms. SWAP operations have come attractive for Russian banks during the systemic liquidity deficit. Systemic liquidity deficit is a situation when banks permanently need in liquidity refinancing from central bank. Standing in situation of systemic liquidity deficit Russian banks use securities as collateral for refinancing operations. When the value of securities quite low compare to the value of liquidity deficit banks have to use another type of collateral such as currency for market type of operations. So SWAP operations are a source of short term liquidity for Russian banks.
We provide comparative statistics for outstanding in different segments of Russian money market in Table 1 The total outstanding on CCP at the end of 2013 year was 1.5 bln. USD. We also provide the total assets value of Russian banking system to highlight the importance of money market (almost 10% of total banking assets). Some information concerning dynamic of the outstanding for different money market segments may be found in Bank of Russia "Money market report" [25] . We based our analysis on daily CBRF banking report "Operations on currency and money markets" [26] containing information on all type of transactions carried out on the OTC money market. In our analysis we concentrate on the deposit market and take into account only uncolleteralised deals in Russian roubles between residents. Taking into account only the deals between residents is due to data limitations. We also exclude deals with Central Bank of Russia and its branches because corresponding rouble obligations are always met and therefore do not generate any risk.
The data used in our analysis cover the interval from January 11 2011 till December 30 2013 and contain information on interbank loans to residents of 185 banks. This data corresponds to roughly 80 % of the total outstanding and can therefore be considered as representative.
Having information on interbank transaction we transformed it into outstanding for each bank with respect to all of its counterparties. As our data cover time interval from January 11 2011 till December 30 2013 we have no information on loans borrowed before January 11 January and returned afterwards. It is not important for short term maturity operations but may be important for large maturities. From Fig.7 showing dynamics of outstanding for deposit operations we see that deals with maturities 1-7 days constitute a significant part of the total outstanding. Long time maturity deals form about 30% of total outstanding. The number of counterparties having at least one deal at a given day slightly changes with time sharply reducing at the end of 2013 due to actions Bank of Russia on rising banking solvency. For the purposes of our analysis we view the interbank credit market as a weighted oriented graph characterized by the weighted adjacency matrix W = {w ij ≥ 0} where link variables w ij > 0 correspond to liabilities of the bank i towards the bank j and are computed by netting the mutual obligations of both banks on the daily basis so that a directed link i → j corresponds to a credit to i provided by j. For a given node outgoing links correspond therefore to its obligations towards neighboring nodes and incoming ones to claims of the node under consideration towards neighboring nodes. Let us note that with this choice of notations default cascades triggered by some initial node propagate along link's direction.
Bow-tie decomposition
In describing systemic risks related to network topology of the interbank market it is essential to take into account the gross structure of the corresponding oriented graph represented by its bow-tie decomposition, see e.g.
[27]. With the above-described definition of the weighted adjacency matrix W the banks are on the daily basis divided into four groups according to the type of their operations. The Out-and In-components contain pure borrowers and lenders correspondingy. The In-Out-component includes banks which are both creditors and lenders. We will show that banks belonging to this component play a crucial role in generating systemic risks. The last group consists of nodes without links. The bow-tie structure includes as a particular important case the core-periphery model with its core belonging to the In-Out-component and periphery to the In-and Out-ones. The structural analysis of the data on interbank network shows that most of the banks having links (60%-70%) belong to the In-component, i.e. act as pure lenders while only 10%-20% belong to the Out-component and act as pure borrowers. The number of pure borrowers and lenders displays pronounced seasonality so that the number of the former increases and of the latter decreases at the beginning of the year. As to the structure of the outstanding, it is predominantly concentrated in the In-Out-component (60-70% of total outstanding) so that the the corresponding banks have a persistent tendency of borrowing (lending) within the In-Out-component. Less important from exposure point of view are the links between the In-Out and In components (20-35% of total outstanding) and the Out and In-Out ones (2-20% of total outstanding). The links between the pure borrowers and pure lenders contain less than 5% of the total outstanding. The In-Out component contains a strongly connected one (SCC) with the size varying from 10% to 15% and carrying 40-60% of the total outstanding demonstrating a significant monopolistic power of several influential actors.
Quantitative characteristics
In this paragraph we discuss some most important quantitative characteristics of the graph of the Russian interbank network such as distributions in the number if incoming and outgoing links, correlations in the degrees of neighboring nodes and degree of clusterization.
The distributions of in-and out-degrees are plotted in Figs. 2 and 3 where we also show the powerlike fits for their tails. The corresponding parameters are given in Tables 2 and 3 . We see, in agreement with other results on interbank networks in the literature [21] that in-and out-degree distributions are asymptotically powerlike.
An analysis shows, in agreement with the results of [21] , that Russian interbank network is characterized by pronounced negative degree correlations (disassortativity). In oriented graphs one deals with several types of degree correlations induced by the bow-tie structure of the network. Proba- Table 3 : Fitting parametres for out degrees bilistic interdependencies of degrees of adjacent nodes are fully characterized by the set of bivariate distributions P A→B (k, l|m, n), where A, B refer to the component of the bow-tie decomposition {I, IO, O} denoting In, In-Out and Out components respectively and the indices k, l and m, n denote the inand out-degrees of the adjacent vertices. In section 3 we will see that in order to provide a good description of the empirical systemic risk characteristics one has to take into account the probability patterns described by P IO→IO (k, l|m, n), etc. The interbank network is characterized by significant clusterization. This feature is illustrated in Fig. 4 , in which clustering coefficient is shown as a function of link probability thus allowing a direct measure of nontrivial clustering present in the network. 
where C stands for the capital, A i denotes the i-th group of assets 4 , RW i is the corresponding risk weight and P i the corresponding provision for nonperforming loans specified by the regulator while O is a collective notation for other risk variables such as market and operational risks which also used under CAR calculation. As the present analysis concentrates on risks related to interbank loans for which the risk weight RW IC is equal to 20%, in what follows we shall use the following simplified version of Eq. (1):
where A IC and P IC denote interbank claims and corresponding regulator specified provision respectively. After a counterparty defaults on its obligations its lenders, in accordance with Russian regulatory document on rules for provision forming, have to form loan loss provision on deals with this counterparty. According to Russian legislation banks have to establish reserves in accordance with borrower's quality and quality of debt servicing. In our simulations we will assume a reserve of 100% and take into account only provision for interbank deposit market operations considering the volume of other operations as fixed.
To assess systemic risk we calculate the size of default cluster triggered by the bankruptcy of a particular bank. The stress-testing procedure we use is as follows:
• A default of a particular bank is assumed. All its creditors form provision on deals with this default counterparty and recalculate their CAR.
• We check whether the new CARs meet regulatory minimum (10% for deposit taking banks which are allowed to attract deposit from individuals and 12% for other non-banking activities like depositary, settlement and payment).
• The procedure is repeated for those creditors for which their CARs fall below the regulatory minimum.
The procedure is repeated for each bank from Out-and In-Out-components 5 . The resulting distribution over the size of default clusters is shown, on the annual basis, in Table 4 and Figs. 5, 6 (in the latter -on the log-log scale): A first important conclusion that can be drawn from the Table 4 Yr \ S 5,6) is that the distribution over the size of default clusters is approximately powerlike indicating a scale-free nature of the process of default cascading. Another important feature revealed by stress-testing is a higher importance in terms of generating default cascades and, therefore, systemic risk, of the banks from In-Out component as compared with those from the Outone. In Table 5 we show the percentage of cases in which a default of the node under consideration triggers a default of another bank for the In-Outand In-components (29 − 38% and 6 − 10% respectively). From Table 5 we also see that the average stability of banks with respect to default risks as characterized by the average CAR underwent, between 2011 and 2013, a significant reduction. It is quite clear that lower values of CAR generate larger systemic risks. Indeed, an analysis in [9] has shown a dramatic dependence of contagion on capital reserves. A dependence of the average size of default cluster on CAR (calculated on the monthly basis) is shown in Fig. 7 . From Fig. 7 it is clearly seen that there indeed exist a It is quite typical for contagion that its volume grows with increasing centrality of the source node, see e.g. [8] . In Fig. 8 we plot a dependence of the size of the default cluster on the out-degree of the bankrupt node (i.e. the number of lenders). We see that indeed the volume of contagion increases with increasing out-degree and that at large out-degrees the dependence in question is distinctly nonlinear so that the volume of contagion shows a fast growth with the out-degree of the source node. From Fig. 8 one can also conclude that, following the above-described reduction in CAR from 2011 to 2013, a volume of contagion has dramatically grown within this period. The key question in developing a model for propagation of contagion is that of topology of default clusters. In our simulation we found out that default clusters combining vulnerable banks are, with very few exceptions, tree-like with the maximal length of branches equal to 4. In directed graphs the simplest nontrivial motifs, triangles, can belong to two types, where all three links are of the same out-type or one link is an in-one. To illustrate possible nontrivial effects related to clustering let us consider a simple example shown in Fig 9: The bank A (black) is an initial defaulter. The bank B Figure 9 : Motifs of length 3 in default cluster (red) is vulnerable through the link with bank A and bank C (green) is safe to default through both links considered in separation but vulnerable to the simultaneous default through the both links. Let us assume that after A goes bankrupt the CAR of the bank B also falls below the regulatory minimum (10%) but the bank C is still safe because its CAR (10.4%) is still above the regulatory threshold. After B defaults, the CAR of the bank C falls below 10% and the bank C also defaults.
Our simulations have shown that the number of triangles of the first type per day is 0.06 and of the second type 1.2. Both numbers are small as compared to total number of default clusters per day considered in our simulations. The effectively tree-like structure of the default cluster that allows to neglect motifs in working out a mathematical model for default cascading. In particular, under this assumption propagation of vulnerability between the nodes can happen only along a single link.
The last key ingredient for modelling default propagation is to quantify vulnerability of a given node with respect to default of at least one of its neighbors. Vulnerability can most naturally be described as a probabilistic characteristic of link's ability to transport contagion from one node to another. We call a link vulnerable if a default of the counterparty may lead to default of another counterparty through this link. The link vulnerability depends on the local geometry of a network. Generically it is defined as a conditional probability v(r, s|k, l) of default propagation from the node with in-and out-degrees r, s to the node with in-and out-degrees k, l. In addition vulnerability depends on the position of the two nodes under con-sideration within the bow-tie structure of the network so that probabilistic pattern of contagion propagation is specified by the conditional probabilities v IO→IO (r, s|k, l), v IO→Out (r, s|k, l) and their more complex modifications.
Systemic credit risk. Mathematical modelling
The mathematical model we use to describe systemic risks on the Russian interbank market is based on empirical findings described above in the Sections 2, 3. Let us reiterate the main features of importance for description of contagion process:
• Degree distributions are fat-tailed.
• The network is characterized by significant disassortative correlations between adjacent nodes.
• Position of a node in the bow-tie structure has to be taken into account explicitly.
• Default clusters are tree-like.
Let us consider a bank from the In-Out component with k + l outgoing links, where k of them lead to the In-Out-component and l to In-component respectively 6 and take a randomly chosen edge linking the chosen node to a node in the In-component which, in addition, has r − 1 incoming links, see Fig. 10 a. This is a simplest case where contagion goes from the In-Outcomponent to the In-one and stops there.
Conditional probability distribution for reaching a vulnerable bank from the In-component following a link from the In-Out-one is described by the generation function N k,l (y)
where we have taken into account that an outgoing link under consideration can lead to a vulnerable bank with probability v IO→In (r|k, l) or safe one with probability 1 − v IO→In (r|k, l) and, through the conditional probability P IO→In (r|k, l), the probabilistic interdependence of the degrees of nodes connected by this link. The corresponding part of the default cluster can therefore described as a projection of the initial network onto a 
The corresponding part of the default cluster can be described as a projection of the initial network onto a graph in which a link in the original graph survives with the probability P IO→IO (u, t, r|k, l) v IO→IO (u, t, r|k, l).
Let us define a generation function F (x, y) = ∞ k,l P IO (k, l)x k y l for the probability for a bank from the In-Out-component to have k and l first neighbors from the In-Out-and In-components respectively. Then the generation function for the number of vulnerable banks in the network is simply F (M, N) . It is easy to see that for calculation of the mean default cluster size one can put y = x and compute a derivative of F (M, N) at point x = 1. We have
where we have used the normalization property of generation functions
so that
where
It is useful to rewrite Eq. (7) in the operator form:
where dM and γ are vectors of length k × l and A is a k × l, k × l matrix size with the elements A (k,l)(u,t) = α u,t,k,l . For solution of Eq.(10) to exist its maximal eigenvalue λ max should satisfy λ max < 1 8 . It reads:
8 In [29] it is shown that less restrictive condition valid in the non-percolative regime
where β u,t,k,l is an element B (u,t),(k,l) of the matrix B = (I − A) −1 . Equation (11) is valid in the absence of a giant cluster and should be modified in the percolative phase, see e.g. [30, 31] To calculate the average size of the default cluster we use empirical conditional probability distributions P IO→In (r|k, l), v IO→In (r|k, l), P IO→IO (u, t, r|k, l) and v IO→IO (u, t, r|k, l) that are calculated on the monthly basis. A comparison of the model predictions and results of stress testing are shown in (Fig.11) . We see a very good agreement between the model and experiment provided one takes into account correlations between the degrees of adjacent nodes captured by P IO→In (r|k, l) and P IO→IO (u, t, r|k, l) and a much poorer one when these correlations are neglected. The remaining deviations can be ascribed to using analytical approximation appropriate to infinite graphs 9 Another source of deviation is in neglecting triangles in default graph. 
Conclusions
Let us formulate once again the main conclusions of the paper.
To build a successful model of contagion propagation in interbank networks one needs to combine empirical studies and adequate theoretical framework. Empirical information of importance is related both to topological characteristics of the interbank market network under consideration and to the process of contagion propagation from node to node that depends, in particular, on interplay between link and node characteristics (volume of loans and bank balance sheets respectively). It was shown that very good description of default cascade simulation can be given in the formalism that explicitly takes into account degree distributions and degree-degree correlations and conidtional probabilities of contagion propagation from one node to another. The results obtained in this paper can be used for estimating systemic risks in interbank networks as well as for analyzing sensitivity of systemic risk with respect to changes in network topology and stability of individual banks. The results can also be used for the analysis of liquidity risks -with the difference of contagion propagation through in-links and modification of vulnerability criterion.
